Resolving conflicts

Following the news has become an increasingly a depressing experience. There is the well-publicised conflict in Gaza, and the much-less publicised but equally brutal conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine, Congo, Somalia, Myanmar, Syria and Yemen. A murderous regime in Iran cloaks its terrorism in the robes of religion, while the head gangster of Russia sees to the extermination of a neighbouring country and the assassination of his political opponents while posing as a pious Christian. Meanwhile equally pious ‘Christian conservatives’ in the USA enthusiastically support a man who disdains their faith and by his behaviour trashes every single Christian value. All of these malevolents know the great truth: that the road to personal power lies through the generation of conflict, the demonisation of enemies and the pretence of being a saviour.

There will, however, come a time when conflicts can be resolved, and we need to work out how to do this most effectively. There is one rule here: avoid identity issues and concentrate on solving the practical problems that are shared, even by those in conflict. Identity issues must be avoided because, by their nature, there is limited possibility of compromise. Peace was arranged in Northern Ireland after centuries of hostility and a decade of sectarian murder because it did not require either side to renounce their identity. Contentious symbols were confined to the tribal heartlands of each side rather than being used to symbolise the state, and more neutral symbols were developed. The Royal Ulster Constabulary became the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The Stormont Assembly became an enforced coalition between the parties that represent each identity.

Practical issues, by contrast, tend to be more amenable to negotiation and compromise because they do not challenge identities. Their resolution requires the conflicting parties to meet and hopefully experience a shared sense of success, providing some demonstrable benefits to take back to their constituents. A succession of successful compromises of this kind can gradually create a belief that the two sides are part, to some degree, of a joint enterprise, and a set of procedures and understandings that can be applied to fresh problems. The most outstanding example of this is the development over the last 70 years of the European Union. After two wars which cost millions of lives and vast destruction, representatives from a small number of states in Western Europe met to agree rules for trade in coal and steel. This was gradually expanded over succeeding decades to include trade in agricultural products and the harmonisation of industrial products. The name ‘European Economic Community’ explicitly denied a desire to challenge national identity.

After a long period of time, a new combined identity might be generated. This has been the hope among many people in Europe, with the consequent renaming of the EEC into the European Union at the Treaty of Maastricht. The adoption of shared symbols like the European Parliament, flag and currency all have the effect of creating a system of two-tier identity. In this respect, the EU follows earlier and rather different multinational states like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. But the history of these states shows the limitations of multinationalism and the way in which they can disintegrate as nationalist politicians use identity politics to promote fragmentation and attain personal power.

Why have some longstanding conflicts like those in Ireland or in Western and Central Europe been resolved, while others such as Israel/Palestine have not? A factor in the former cases was that all sides in the conflicts were exhausted and recognised the catastrophic failure of violence as a solution to longstanding grievances. But another factor was the availability of supervising powers with some ability to enforce agreement. In the case of Ireland, these were the British and Irish governments, with the USA pushing for agreement. In the case of the European Union, the USA (and to a lesser degree the UK) wished to see greater co-operation to promote greater prosperity and thereby avoid Western Europe falling into the Soviet orbit.

There was a time when the USA had a similar role in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Serious attempts were made under Presidents Bush Senior and Clinton to bring the Israeli and Palestinian authorities together to agree mutual recognition and the resolution of conflicts. This failed because the USA focussed primarily on resolving identity issues rather than solving the practical problems of security. Identity issues were particularly difficult because mutual recognition was seen as zero-sum (ie one side could only gain if the other side loses). For Palestinians, it would mean the end of their dream of eradicating Jewish occupation (and, for some Palestinian factions, the Jews themselves). For Israeli nationalists, it meant losing the dream of a Jewish state across the historic heartlands of Judaism in the West Bank. The security issue, by contrast, could have been resolved. For Israel, ‘security’ meant an end to border raids and the random killing of civilians by Palestinian forces. For Palestinians, ‘security’ meant an end to the settlements Israel continued to build in the West Bank and an end to the oppressive Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  

But another factor in the failure of peace talks was the very weakness of the authorities in both sides. Israeli governments are a succession of weak coalitions with limited ability to control aggressive settlers on the West Bank. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation was an umbrella body which included several militant groups that aimed to derail any peace process. Neither Israel nor the PLO could enforce a peace deal even if an agreement was possible between them. This means that peace could only be achieved if, as in Northern Ireland, both sides were subject to pressure from more powerful protectors. In the case of Israel/Palestine, this would be the USA and the major Arab states.  

But since the time of President Clinton, US foreign policy in the Middle East has been a catastrophe. The Iraq War of Bush Junior caused more than a million deaths, the destabilisation of Iraq and a growth in Iranian influence. Iran was then able to mobilise a coalition of states and non-state forces against the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Obama’s government promoted political change in Arab states, which led to civil wars in Syria and Libya and the temporary ascendancy of the Muslim League in Egypt. Trump completed the general drift of US policy towards giving Israel a carte blanche to invade and attack its neighbours. Countries which do this essentially empower their smaller ally to drag them into conflict, as the German Empire discovered with Austria-Hungary in 1914.

The gross over-reaction of the Netanyahu Government in Israel to Hamas atrocities may lead to a greater US distance from its aggressive ally. This may be the only hope for achieving some form of security for the Israeli and Palestinian nations.